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Susan Mendus's book, Impartiality in Moral and Political 
Philosophy, is an attempt to reconcile the ongoing conflict between 
partial and impartial concerns both in everyday decision-making 
and in the context of political philosophy (p. 7). The thought is 
since we live in a pluralist society, along with people who do not 
share the same commitments as we do, we have to account for 
pluralism and when pluralism and justice conflict, we must be able 
to justify priority of justice for those who do not have any such 
commitments (p. 9,11). Mendus is writing this book for those (in 
academic Philosophy) who already have a commitment to friendship 
and have concerns about the role that impartiality plays in those 
relationships, and not for the amoralist who does not commit herself 
or himself to any morality at all (p. 77). 
Mendus argues that partial relationships set the grounds for 
impartiality. This is the idea that our partial concerns are foundations 
for impartiality. We first learn certain principles in partial 
relationships and through those, we learn to become impartial (p. 
119). This idea is mainly cashed out in chapter two, the central 
chapter. All other chapters are either setting the stage for this view 
to emerge, or to "house" this new idea of impartiality. 
Initially Mendus views impartiality as grounded in commitment 
to equality (p. 7), she later makes a rather interesting move and 
grounds impartiality in a commitment to "specific others whom we 
care about and whose needs and interests are directly motivating 
for us" (p. 76). This is useful because those who do not include 
impartiality in their comprehensive conceptions of the good can be 
motivated to accept impartial principles (of equality) at the societal 
level. 
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Most crucial and difficult, for anyone who holds an impartial 
view is solving the conflict between the demands of partial and 
impartial relationships. Mendus suggests that "the conflict is a 
difficult one precisely because impartiality contains within it a 
recognition of the significance of our partial concerns for particular 
others" (p. 126). This recognition is the salient factor here. We 
derive impartiality from understanding people's partial relationships 
because partial relationships are motivating and have a moral 
dimension that ultimately outstrips its partialist birthplace. Suppose 
I ask a friend to lie for me and she does, although she might be 
reluctant. Some might suggest that this is a great example to illustrate 
why friendship and morality cannot mix (p. 81-82). Mendus 
disagrees. In an intriguing turn, she offers, 
[T]he very fact that my friend will be reluctant to submit 
my request to moral scrutiny, and the very fact that to do 
so would be at odds with friendship, should make me 
reluctant to make the request in cases where acceding to 
it involves committing moral wrongs. The directly 
motivating character of friendship can itself prompt moral 
consideration, and we see how it can do that if we take up 
the perspective of the person making the request, rather 
than the perspective of the person who is the recipient of 
the request, (p. 83) 
She shifts the burden of situation on the person asking, and not the 
person asked to commit some wrong. She argues that morality is 
grounded not on equality but on caring relationships (p. 86). Partial 
relationships motivate people to act justly. Because I know that my 
friend would lie for me, "what I can properly ask of her [should 
be]... in the direction of impartial considerations" (p. 89). This is a 
very interesting claim. One, however, wonders how we know what 
impartial treatments of others are. This sounds more like we know 
impartial obligations (knowing you should not ask people that you 
do not know to lie for you) first and then we try to integrate it in our 
partial relationships. 
Further, the reader might still wonder how partial relationships 
are adequate grounds for impartial ones. Although I think Mendus's 
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proposal of how this happens is extremely original and is perhaps 
one of the most important parts of chapter three, the topic never 
gets as much attention as one might expect. While we do learn 
morality from our partial relationships, there is still little reason to 
think that people would learn impartial morality from these partial 
relationships. Her proposal here inevitably sets the stage for much 
future development. 
So far, we are also not told the answer to the important question 
that the debate rests on, as she too confesses, "where does legitimate 
partiality end and obligation of impartiality start?" 
With the lying example, Mendus completely ignores the 
importance of the scenario where I do ask my friend to lie for me 
and not acknowledging her personhood in an impartial way (p. 81-
82). Mendus interestingly turns the issue, not to what a "partial 
friend" should do, but rather what I should not have asked of my 
friend. This dilemma is crucial because the only reason I ask her is 
because we have a partial relationship. I did not just grab someone 
in the street and ask for his or her help. 
Naturally to get impartial morality off the ground, Mendus 
gives an account of care and caring relationships, in chapter three. 
Caring is an objective matter that has a critical dimension. In caring 
we need to be aware of other people's needs and interests, be 
"persistent", and since the things that we care about motivate us, 
they should guide our actions (p. 105-108). It is essential for the 
caregiver to have agency and "second-order volitions" because 
caring appears as a second-order volition (p. 98-99, 103). If the 
amoral ist is not concerned about which of her desires win then we 
cannot get morality off the ground with her, be it partial or impartial 
(p. 107). What about people who do care? 
We get the answer in the final chapter. She argues "that 
grounding morality in what we care about renders it congruent 
with our own good" (p. 120). It will not leave us alienated, as moral 
theories tend to do. Also, "it is important for the reconciliation of 
pluralism and priority [of justice] which, after all, is the problem 
that motivated this book." (p. 131) This claim might be surprising. 
In the first chapter she tells us that the aim of this book is to reconcile 
the tension between partial and impartial commitments. 
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The upshot is, we are able to argue for impartial morality, not 
by appeal to overlapping consensus of comprehensive conceptions 
of the good but by appeal to its congruency for one's own good. 
However, those whose comprehensive conception opposes 
impartiality should accept impartial morality based on a "modus 
vivendi status" (p. 162). With this point a tension appears; this 
reasoning is precisely what she intends to get away from in chapter 
one, where she expresses her intention to articulate a political theory 
that everyone can consent to and no one would have to be forced 
into acting in a certain way. But since she is giving up the whole 
idea here, she has to hold that we could coerce people to do things 
that do not fit in their comprehensive conceptions of the good. She 
ignores what she claims to be crucial in the modern societies, 
namely, pluralism, and its permanence. Her solution becomes what 
she has set out to reject from the beginning. At this point the reader 
is left wondering, because she appears to "give up" the worthy 
project at hand. I believe she was in the right direction and should 
have kept going that way. 
Back to the issue of care, a couple of points remain. By focusing 
on second-order desires, namely caring desires, Mendus explicitly 
excludes non-human animals from the realm of care, at least as 
caregivers. This is implausible. Animals show great attachment to 
their offsprings and tend to their needs. While in danger, they will 
do anything to protect them; this is caring. On a more positive side, 
a very interesting point in her book is the discussion of the critical 
dimension of care. For instance, Isabel's upbringing has left her 
with no way of evaluating what is important. Mendus refers to her 
as "morally undone" (p. 115). In her quest to learn what she cares 
about, she meets her husband who she thinks is a free-thinking 
person as she, but really he is just after her money; "He displays, 
not his disregard for the values of society, but his total subservience 
to them" (p. 114). She marries him and after doing so, she comes 
to only care about what he cares about. The critical level of caring 
is missing in her caring. When she becomes informed of his wrong 
deeds and lack of character, Isabel tells him that, "you have made 
me as bad as yourself (p. 115). Mendus, rightly, contends this 
shows her loss was not just a matter of happiness but also morality. 
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The book is marvelously detailed and thorough. She gives a 
detailed account of each alternative view, along with criticisms and 
responses to those, and offers her own view, as well as summaries 
in between chapters that often take us back to the original question 
relevant to the chapter. Among the book's virtues is that it is well 
grounded in the analytical tradition and the history of the ideas that 
are being explored in that tradition. I find it a valuable addition to 
the field of ethics, and political philosophy. I certainly recommend 
this book as a worthy fare to use for graduate and upper level 
honors undergraduate philosophy students. 
